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//. JURISDICTION 
The Judicial Code of Utah states, "The Court of Appeals has 
appellate jurisdiction . . . over appeals from district court involving 
domestic relations cases, including, but not limited to, divorce, 
annulment, property division, child custody, support, visitation, 
adoption, and paternity." Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(i) (1995). 
The underlying matter was a divorce and the issue on appeal 
concerns property division; therefore, this Court has appropriate 
jurisdiction to consider this appeal. 
///. ISSUE FOR REVIEW 
A. Statement of Issue 
Plaintiff is appealing the equal division of a marital asset which 
existed at the time of the Parties' separation but which had been spent 
by the time of trial some twenty-seven months later. It is well 
established in Utah law that the marital estate should be valued as of 
the time of the divorce decree. Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 P.2d 1218 
(Utah 1980); Berger v. Berger, 713 P.2d 695 (Utah 1985); Howell v. 
Howell, 806 P.2d 1209 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). While acknowledging this 
general rule in Morgan v. Morgan, this Court held that such is not 
intractable; [hjowever, the trial court's findings must be sufficiendy 
detailed to explain its basis for deviating from the general rule. 795 
P.2d 684, 688 (Utah App. 1990). 
In the case before this Court, since the value of the marital asset 
of $10,377 in a money market account on December 17, 1993, which 
had not been a part of a pension plan for more than four years, was 
zero at the time of the Decree of Divorce, Plaintiff contends that the 
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division of this marital asset by the trial court without making anv 
findings to substantiate its deviation from established precedent was 
clearly erroneous, contrary to Utah law and an abuse of the court's 
discretion. 
B. Standard of Review 
Trial courts have considerable discretion in determining . . . 
property distribution in divorce cases, and will be upheld on appeal 
unless a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion is demonstrated. 
Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331, 1333 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Findings of fact in divorce appeals are subject to the clearly erroneous 
standard of review such that "due regard shall be given to the 
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses." 
Utah R.Civ.P. 52 (a); Jense v. Jense, 784 P.2d 1249, 1251 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989). Conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness and given no 
special deference on appeal. Smith v. Smith, 793 P.2d 407, 409 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1990). 
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
The underlying case giving rise to the issue on appeal is a divorce 
action. After twenty-six years of marriage, the Parties seeking to 
divorce separated on January 7, 1994 and Plaintiff filed for divorce at 
the end of that month. The matter came on for trial March 14, 1996, 
some twenty-six plus months from the Parties' separation. 
Defendant claimed at trial that Plaintiff had a money market 
account containing over ten thousand dollars as of December 17, 1993, 
twenty-seven months earlier. He produced no evidence that any of 
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this asset remained at pretrial much less at trial because it did not. He 
produced no evidence that Plaintiff dissipated this asset improperly. 
To the contrary, Plaintiff testified at trial she spent this asset to 
maintain the mortgage, pay on marital debts and support herself. 
Defendant produced evidence at trial that he paid a total of only 
$100 on marital debt for the entire twenty-seven months of this 
action's pendency in spite of having been court-ordered on April 25, 
1994 to maintain payments to six creditors, two of which were non-
marital creditors on accounts in his name. 
Without any evidence to justify its decisions, the trial court 
distributed the Parties' assets/liabihties all to Defendant's decided 
advantage and Plaintiffs decided detriment. The trial court awarded 
Defendant the equity in the marital property determined at the time of 
trial so that he received the benefit of the twenty-seven mortgage 
payments Plaintiff made without offset for having made all those 
payments herself. Then it awarded Defendant half the value, 
determined at the time of separation, of an asset Plaintiff had no choice 
but to consume because her income alone, especially after IRS 
garnishments, was insufficient to maintain the mortgage, the marital 
debts Plaintiff was court-ordered to pay in addition to the debts 
Defendant failed to pay that she paid and to support herself as well. 
Plaintiff appeals the trial court's deviation, without making any 
findings to substantiate it, from established precedent as being clearly 
erroneous, contrary to Utah law and an abuse of the court's discretion. 
B. Statement Of The Facts 
In 1989, Marriott Inc., Plaintiffs employer sold its air catering 
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division to Caterair International and dispersed its pension holdings of 
its former employees to those employees. Plaintiff continued on in the 
employment of Caterair. Plaintiff received $24,247 less $2172.97 in 
Federal taxes withheld or a total of $22,074.03 on February 22, 1990. 
(Appendix a-1 & a-2). She intended to roll this distribution over 
within the next year but paid on marital debts instead. By December 
17, 1993, she had only $10,377.26 of the original amount left in a 
money market account where she had placed it after it was disbursed. 
(Appendix a- 3). 
The Parties separated in early January, 1994 and Plaintiff filed 
for divorce on January 31, 1994. (R-l through 6). Plaintiffs net pay at 
that time had been approximately $1000 per month. (R-27) Besides a 
mortgage payment of $434 per month which Plaintiff continued to pay 
as she had always done, she initially had to pay over $500 in overdue 
utility bills she discovered Defendant had not paid in order to prevent 
these services from being terminated. (R-26 & R-29 through 30, 
respectively). In addition, she continued to maintain payments on 
other marital debts, her own maintenance, transportation expenses, 
monthly utilities, attorney fees and court costs, etc. (R-27, 29 through 
30). 
Shortly after the Parties' separation the IRS began garnishing 
Plaintiffs wages. For March and April of 1994, her take home pay was 
approximately $200 per month. (R-28). Also after the separation, she 
discovered Defendant had been lying about having paid property taxes 
he assured her he was paying and that none had been paid since 1990. 
Plaintiff paid $1900 in March, 1994, just prior to the IRS' garnishment 
of her wages, for three years' back taxes on the marital residence. (R-
4 
29). She had already just paid the IRS and the Utah tax commission 
$500 each for back income taxes to try to prevent garnishments the 
IRS imposed anyway. (R-29). She had no choice but to rely on the 
monies in the money market account to pay on debts and her own 
maintenance. (R-166 through 167). 
A Motion Hearing for Temporary Relief came before the court 
commissioner on April 25, 1994. In the minute entry of that hearing, 
the court ordered Plaintiff to maintain the mortgage and three 
obligations owed to Cypress Credit Union. (R-53). Defendant was 
ordered to maintain, among other obligations, $100 monthly payments 
on the IRS tax liability as well as "make arrangements with the state 
tax commissioner to pay sum each month to prevent any further 
collection efforts against either party." Id. Each was to "maintain those 
debts in their [sic] own names." Id. Defendant was allowed to keep all 
his earned income and his AT & T pension income of $213 per month 
to enable him to maintain the debts as ordered (no temporary 
alimony). Id. 
At trial, Defendant produced only one bona fide receipt 
evidencing he made one $100 payment to the IRS on July 14,1994 and 
no other evidence of having maintained any other marital debt 
obligations as ordered. (Appendix a-6). At trial, he also produced a 
letter dated August 5, 1994 from the state tax commission indicating 
he had been granted a hardship status deferring any requirements of 
payment from him for twelve months during which time the interest 
and penalties would continue to accrue. (Appendix a-7). This did not 
prevent the state from going after and seizing Plaintiffs returns, 
however. Apparently Defendant neglected to file any income tax 
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returns since the last joint filing with Plaintiff in 1993 (not submitted 
on discovery requests). Most likely he did not file in order to avoid 
seizure of any refunds due him. 
In the Second Amended Decree of Divorce, the court has ordered 
the parties to pay all marital debts owing out of the equity in the 
marital home. (R-365). Because interest and penalties continued to 
accumulate on the unpaid state taxes and all other marital debts 
Defendant was ordered to pay but did not, Plaintiff has been further 
penalized by having to "pay" half the penalties and interest that have 
accumulated on the unpaid debts Defendant was to have paid that were 
in his or both their names. Debts Defendant was ordered to maintain 
that were in Plaintiffs name, Plaintiff maintained when she discovered 
Defendant was not paying on these. The penalties and interest plus the 
unpaid principal on these marital debts obviously amount to more than 
was initially owed on the debts in the first place, again to Plaintiffs 
detriment while Defendant kept his pension and income to do with 
whatever he wanted, resulting in further serious inequity. 
What with no help from Defendant toward paying marital debts 
in spite of having been court-ordered to do so, Plaintiff used all her 
income, all the remainder of the pension she had intended to roll over 
years earlier but paid on debts Defendant neglected since she received 
it both before and after the Parties' separation, and still she had to 
borrow money from her family in order to live. (R-166 through 167). 
Plaintiff has been unable to repay the monies she has had to borrow 
from family. 
Plaintiff testified at trial that she had no control of Marriott's 
dispersion of her pension funds. (Transcript-3 @ 10-12 & Transcript-5 
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@ 13-14). She testified that Defendant was unemployed and unable to 
make house payments at the time, so these funds were used to pay 
marital debts and that although Defendant promised to replace them 
for "their retirement," he never did. (Transcript-1 @ 10-17). Plaintiff 
also testified that she had over ten thousand dollars remaining in a 
money market account prior to the Parties' separation. (Transcript-3 @ 
13-14 & Transcript-7 @ 7). Plaintiff said that she paid marital debts 
with that money and that she had none of it left. (Transcript-3 @ 16-
19; Transcript-7 @18-25; Transcript-8 @ 1-6 & 25 & Transcript-9 @1-
10) also see (R-166 through 167). 
At trial, no testimony was solicited from Defendant (nor from any 
other witness) that Plaintiff did not, in fact, pay these debts as she 
testified. Credibility of conflicting testimonies is not nor was at issue. 
No evidence was produced that Plaintiff had/has hidden this money 
nor dissipated these funds improperly not acted obstructively, yet the 
trial court treated her as though she had done one or more of these 
without any evidence of wrongdoing before it and without any findings 
to substantiate such so as to support its deviation from established 
precedent. 
The trial court awarded Defendant all his retirement and pension 
income. (R-364). He was allowed to keep his Brasher's retirement 
valued at approximately $2000 at the time of trial. The value of 
Defendant's AT & T pension depends solely on how many more years 
he lives to collect the $213 per month he currently receives and has 
been receiving even before the Parties separated. He has enjoyed the 
exclusive use of these monthly payments for three years since the 
separation amounting to approximately $7500. Although the court 
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awarded Plaintiff her presently accumulated pension plan valued at 
approximately $16,000 at trial, before she can begin to draw on her 
retirement, Defendant will have realized four times the three-year 
payout he has already received. Yet the Court then awarded half the 
amount remaining as of December, 1993 from Plaintiffs Marriott reim-
bursed funds (which had not been a pension plan for four years by the 
time the parties separated and that she was compelled to spend to pay 
the Parties' debts and to support herself) to Defendant in addition to 
the inequitable division of the Parties' retirement monies. 
Rather than punishing Defendant's disregard of its orders, the 
trial court rewarded Defendant's contempt for its orders by obviously 
favoring him in its final decree. Plaintiff obeyed the orders as directed 
by the trial court yet she was significantly shortchanged. The court 
provided no reason for this inequitable distribution of the Parties' asset 
and debt allocation. Its orders appear capricious and a clear abuse of 
its discretion. 
V. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court deviated from the standards set by this court for 
determining the value of a certain marital asset, namely a money 
market account that contained more than ten thousand dollars just 
prior to the Parties' separation but did not exist at the time of trial 
twenty-seven months later, by awarding half the monies determined at 
the time the Parties separated, to Defendant. Although according to 
these standards, any such deviation should have been supported by 
sufficiently detailed findings to explain its basis for deviating from the 
general rule, the trial court provided no, much less sufficiently detailed 
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findings for its deviation. 
On the contrary, all evidence and testimony at trial supported 
Plaintiffs position that she did not dissipate, hide nor act obstructively 
regarding this asset but that she was compelled to spend the asset on 
(1) maintaining debts she and Defendant were court-ordered to pay 
(something he did not do); (2) paying all the mortgage payments on the 
marital property for which she is to receive no offset even though 
Defendant benefits from her twenty-seven payments in significantly 
increased equity (mortgage reduced by Plaintiffs payments) at the 
time of divorce; (3) and supporting herself. The trial court provided 
Plaintiff no allowance for self-maintenance costs while Defendant 
freely spent all his income without having to account for his failure to 
maintain those debts he was ordered to pay. 
VI. ARGUMENT 
In Bernham v. Bernham, this Court held that trial courts in 
divorce proceedings are given considerable discretion in adjusting the 
parties' financial and property interests. 716 P.2d 781, 782 (Utah 
1986). The trial court's actions are presumed valid, and to overcome 
that presumption, the appealing party must demonstrate that there 
was "misunderstanding or misapplication of the law resulting in 
substantial and prejudicial error, or that the evidence clearly 
preponderated against the findings, or that such a serious inequity has 
resulted from the order as to constitute an abuse of the trial court's 
discretion." Colman v. Colman, 743 P.2d 782, 789 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) 
[quoting McCrary v. McCrary, 599 P.2d 1248, 1250 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987)]. Plaintiff argues that the trial court misapplied the law 
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resulting in substantial and prejudicial error and that a serious 
inequity has resulted from its orders as to constitute an abuse of the 
trial court's discretion. 
In Peck v. Peck, this Court held that although assets are 
generally valued at the time of the divorce decree, the trial court may 
value the property at an earlier date where one party has dissipated an 
asset, hidden its value or otherwise acted obstructively. 738 P.2d 
1050,1052 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). Likewise, this Court upheld the trial 
court's deviation to value the marital estate at an earlier time than at 
trial in Jefferies v. Jefferies because the trial court found that the 
husband's transfer of money from the marital estate to the children 
dissipated marital assets in an attempt to hide these from the wife. 
985 P.2d 835, 838 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
No allegations were asserted at any time during the pendency of 
the present action nor was evidence introduced at trial to suggest 
Plaintiff "dissipated" this asset, hid its value or otherwise acted 
obstructively. In fact, to the contrary, Plaintiff testified at trial as to 
how this money was utilized. Defendant did not challenge Plaintiffs 
testimony concerning this asset, how it was used nor did he produce 
any evidence that Plaintiff might have hidden this asset from him at 
the time of trial. Defendant did not dispute that this asset was gone. 
In Andersen v. Andersen, the facts adduced at trial indicated that 
defendant held an IRA worth over $8000 on July of 1986. Two months 
later and after the parties separated, defendant cashed the IRA, taking 
over $4000 and transferring $4000 to another bank certificate. Within 
a month after that, he cashed the $4000 certificate. At trial held 
approximately six months later, defendant testified only $3300 
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remained of that IRA "but did not explain disposition of the remainder 
of the funds." 757 P.2d 476, 479 (Utah App. 1988). This Court 
remanded this issue to the trial court to determine how the money was 
spent. 
Over a period of twenty-seven months in the current case, 
Plaintiff used a money market account of about twice the amount that 
defendant in Andersen consumed in only seven months; however, she 
testified how those monies were expended. Id. The Court made no 
finding, as it did in Andersen, as to the disposable income of the parties 
after paying the court-ordered marital debts and in Plaintiffs case, the 
taxes and debts Defendant failed to pay. Id. It is only equitable that 
an individual be allowed at least something on which to live. Where 
Plaintiff was forced by garnishment to pay Defendant's court-ordered 
obligations while trying to maintain those she was ordered to pay and 
those he was ordered to pay and did not, that she would have to rely 
on something other than her income (i.e. the money market account 
and loans from family members) to pay on the marital debts as well as 
pay for her own maintenance should have been obvious to the trial 
court. 
In its decision to divide a non-existent asset and only allow 
Plaintiff an offset against marital debt paid and holding mortgage 
payments would not be considered marital debt, the trial court failed to 
provide Plaintiff any allowance for even marginal living expenses. It 
placed no such burden on Defendant. He was allowed to keep all his 
earnings and pension benefits he received during this period to spend 
however he wished during these same twenty-seven months without 
paying, as ordered, on the marital debts. Then he was allowed to enjoy 
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the increased equity in the marital home that Plaintiff bought down by 
maintaining the mortgage, again without any findings to Justify this 
disparate and inequitable treatment. 
In Morgan v. Morgan II, this Court held that it is well settled that 
the present value . . . of retirement accounts accrued during the 
marriage, are marital assets and.. . should be valued as of the time of 
the divorce and should be equitably divided. 854 P.2d 559 (Utah App. 
1993). The value of Appellant's retirement account with Marriott was 
zero on February 21, 1990. It was still zero at the time of trial. 
Plaintiff had no Marriott retirement account valued at $10,377 as of 
December 17, 1993. Yet the trial court held this to be a retirement 
account to be divided as a retirement benefit. This characterization is 
not consistent with the facts and therefore clearly erroneous. 
In Shepherd v. Shepherd, plaintiff challenged the trial court's 
decision to value the marital estate at the time of separation rather 
than at the time of trial. 876 P.2d 429, 433 (Utah App. 1994). There 
the trial court made detailed findings that plaintiff not only used more 
of the marital assets than authorized but had seriously depleted the 
marital estate. Based on these detailed findings, this Court held that 
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in valuing the marital estate 
at the date of separation rather than the date of trial. Id. 
Not only did the trial court use a date other than the date of 
divorce to determine the value of a single marital asset without 
supporting its decision with any findings of fact explaining its deviation 
from the general rule, but assuming it may have deviated because it 
found Plaintiff used all the asset, it made no finding that she did so 
wrongfully. Plaintiff maintains that it should have used the same date 
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to evaluate all the marital estate rather than arbitrarily and 
capriciously picking and choosing which assets were to be evaluated at 
the time of separation versus at the time of divorce without providing 
any justification in its findings for obviously favoring Defendant 
financially by selecting different times to value different marital 
property as it did. 
The trial court's decision has resulted in Plaintiffs being required 
to pay for half an asset she no longer has while she was compelled to 
use all her assets including the expended money market account to 
significantly reduce the mortgage on the marital real property and 
increase Defendant's equity based on her buy down of the mortgage 
and the inflationary increase in the property's value over twenty-
seven months. However viewed, this decision requires Plaintiff to pay 
twice and Defendant benefits even though he came before the court 
with unclean hands by not paying, other than making a token attempt, 
on the marital debts as ordered. The result is neither equitable nor 
substantiated by the trial court's findings. 
Finally, in Rappleye v. Rappleye, this court determined that the 
evidence before the trial court indicated that a certain cash account had 
a negative balance at the time of trial but that that court valued the 
account at the time of the parties' separation two years prior to trial 
without any subsidiary findings to support its determination [emphasis 
added]. 855 P.2d 260, 262 (Utah App. 1993). This Court held that 
because such valuation is contrary to the general rule that the marital 
estate is valued at the time of the divorce decree, the trial court's 
decision was vacated and the issue remanded to the trial court for 
more detailed findings regarding the date at which the account should 
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be valued, as well as its basis for valuing it as of such date [emphasis 
added]. Id. at 263. 
As in Rappleye, Plaintiff maintains the trial court, without justifi-
cation, erred by establishing the value of a marital asset twenty-seven 
months before trial when that asset did not exist at trial while 
providing no findings of fact, much less sufficiently detailed findings, to 
explain its basis for such a deviation. Id. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
According to its decision in Munns v. Munns, this Court has held 
that the trial court is allowed considerable discretion regarding the 
division of marital property, as long as it exercises its discretion in 
accordance with the standards set bv the appellate courts [emphasis 
added]. 790 P.2d 116, 118 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). Those standards 
include that the marital estate should be valued as of the time of the 
divorce decree and any deviations from this general rule must 
substantiated by sufficiently detailed findings to explain its basis for 
deviating from that general rule. 
I In the present case, the value of some of the marital assets were 
determined as of the time of the divorce, but another was determined 
as of the time of separation resulting in substantial prejudice favoring 
Defendant to PlaintifFs detriment and resulting in a serious inequity as 
to the division of the Parties' assets and liabilities. The trial court made 
no findings and Defendant produced no evidence of wrongdoing by 
Plaintiff to justify the court's deviations. 
Plaintiff seeks relief as a result of this appeal from the burdens 
imposed on her by the trail court's apparently arbitrary decision to 
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pick and choose when to value certain assets and liabilities so that the 
Parties enjoy a truly equitable property division as a result of their 
divorce. She maintains the value of all the marital assets, the marital 
estate, should either be determined as of the time of divorce or all the 
assets should be valued as of the time of separation. 
If the marital estate is valued at the time of divorce, the money 
market account is zero and the Defendant benefits from the increased 
equity in the marital home due to inflation and the mortage buy-down 
by Plaintiff. If the marital estate is valued at the time of separation, 
Defendant receives half the money market account but not the benefit 
of Plaintiffs twenty-seven mortgage payments. Either of these 
determinations is far more equitable than what the trial court did. 
Plaintiff is not guilty of depleting the marital estate over the 
pendency of this action. In fact, she is the only Party who made any 
attempt to preserve it (and she went without even basic necessities 
during this time in order to do so). Defendant, on the other hand, did 
not pay on the debts he was ordered to maintain thereby depleting the 
marital estate through increased penalties and interest both Parties 
have been ordered to pay. 
VII. REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT 
Plaintiff does not believe that oral argument would materially 
assist the Court's consideration of this matter. She can add little more 
than they has already put into writing within this document. 
DATED this 25th day of November, 1996. 
Karen S. Peterson 
Attorney for Appellant/Plaintiff 
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IX. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I served two true and correct copies of the 
foregoing brief on Tineke Van Dijk, attorney for Appellee/Defendant, 
by hand-delivering them on this 25 th day of November, 1996, to her 
office located at 243 East 400 South, #301, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111. 
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APPENDIX 
SELECTED TRIAL EXHIBITS 
a 
001 
HITMDRAHAL REPORT 
HARRIOTT CORPORATION EMPLOYEES 
PROFIT SHARING, SAVINGS AMO 
RETIREMENT PLAN AND TRUST 
PAGE 613 
02/21/90 
HEIDEMAN,V A 
PARTICIPANT STATUS R 
HITHDRAHAL CODE LC 
528-60-1267 
EMPLOYMENT PARTICIPATION TERMINATION PAYROLL 
DATE OAFE DATE TYPE 
04/20/82 04/23/83 12/15/89 R 
DIVISION 
21301 
PORTION 
OPENING 
BALANCE 
FORFEITED 
AMOUNT 
VESTED 
AMOUNT 
HITHDRAHAL 
AMOUNT 
CLOSING 
BALANCE 
SAVINGS FUNO 
BASIC BEFORE-TAX SAVINGS 
BASIC AFTER-TAX SAVINGS 
ADDL BEFORE-TAX SAVINGS 
ADDL AFTER-TAX SAVINGS 
PRIOR COMPANY ACCOUNT 
TOTAL SAVINGS FUNO 
4,587.02 
4,715.02 
2,598.06 
367.53 
11,979.38 
24,247.01 
00 
00 
00 
00 
00 
0.00 
4,587.02 
4,715.02 
2,598.06 
367.53 
11,979.38 
24,247.01 
-4,587.02 
-4,715.02 
-2,598.06 
-367.53 
-11,979.38 
-24,247.01 
00 
00 
00 
00 
00 
0.00 
D I S T R I B U T I O N D A T A T A X I N F O R M A T I O N 
* 
TOTAL VALUE OF DISTRIBUTION 
NET EMPLOYEE CONTRIBUTIONS 
UNREALIZED APPRECIATION 
TOTAL TAXABLE AMOUNT 
24,247.01 
2,517.191 
0.001 
21,729.82 
TOTAL TAXABLE AMOUNT 21,729.82 
CAPITAL GAIN AMOUNT 0.00 
ORDINARY INCOME AMOUNT 21,729.82 
•A 
MARRIOTT CORPORATION , 
EMPLOYEES PROFIT SHARING. SAVINGS 
AND RETIREMENT PLAN ANO TRUST 
WASHINGTON. DC. 20058 
DIS jpi 
INT 
COM 
yum IN JTAIEMENT 
KEFORTAX 
EREST 
ANY 
FED TAX 
TOTAL DISTRIBUTION 
CK DATE 
000114!>50 
02/22/90 
28-40-1267 
A WEIDEMAN 
2517.19 
6020.13 
3722.31 
11979.38 
2172.98-
$22,074.03 
A l l AMOUNTS REFLECTED ON THIS STATEMENT. EXCLUDING AFTER-TAX 
SAVINGS. ARE CONSIDERED TAXABLE INCOME. SEE ENCLOSURE FOR 
FURTHER TAX INFORMATION. 
II., I 
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ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL iSANK 
Mi»mo««f FvueMi Ot*oos«i insurance CofOOfalion M O N E Y M A R K E T A C C O U N T 
II II I I Itl 1 • ' 
— iii111141f i f I (111 (1111!1111II it *111111111111111•11fIIIili 
V ARLENE WEIDEMAN 
ARLENE V THOMPSON 
6181 CEDAR ST 
MURRAY UT 8 4 1 0 7 - 7 0 3 3 
0 H 
P 29 
ACCOUNT TJUMelR" 
014-603260 
STATEMENT DATE"' 
12/17/93 
PAGE NO. 
BALANCE 
, LAST STATEMENT CHECKS ANO 
NUMtflt OTHER CHARGES AMOUNT MUMttft 
D€*»OSI TS BALANCE 
THIS STATEMENT 
CHECKS K f ^ S , r °ATE »* .... 
X2/17 « ° ™ » + J S « I O K DESCRJPTIOH 
.335.89 
DAILY BALANCE SUMMARY 
DATE BALANCE 
1 2 / 1 7 ioTllTe ° A T E BALANCE SATE BALANCE 
NSMBEP *PCENTAGE YIELD EARNED 
NUMBER OF DAYS IN PERIOD 2.72% 33 
< 
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^jS ^ N . Department of the Treasury 
• T V I H *nterna ' Revenue Service 
QGDEN, UT 84201 
l.iilll.lillllil.M.M.I.l...!u..I.I..II..I.I...Ml....ll.,llll 
DUANE G & V ARLENE WEIDEMAN 
1634 THORNHILL DRIVE APT 208 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84123-5936342 
FOR ASSISTANCE CALL: 
** IF YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS, ** 
** REFER TO THIS INFORMATION: ** 
NUMBER OF THIS NOTICE: CP-521 
DATE OF THIS NOTICE: 01-18-95 
TAXPAYER IDENT. NUM: 528-44-9698 
TAX FORM: 1040 
TAX PERIOD: 12-31-90 
[^DEFENDANT'S 
1-800-829-1040 
IWmm^ 
YOUR NEXT PAYMENT IS DUE SOON 
Your next payment of $100.00 is due on 01-28-95 as 
required by your installment agreement. Please tear off the payment 
voucher from the end of this notice and send it in the enclosed 
envelope • 
The current status of your account is shown below. We apply 
installment payments to tax periods in the order we assessed the 
periods. 
FORM NUMBER CAF 
1040 0 
1040 0 
TAX PERIOD ENDED 
12-31-90 
12-31-92 
AMOUNT 
$170.22 
$430.51 
$100.00 Payment due 
Total balance owed including penalties and interest: 
Please pay your future installments on time. If you donft we may 
have to cancel your installment agreement. 
The federal income tax is a "pay-as-you-go" tax. You must pay the 
tax as you earn or receive income during the year. There are two 
easy ways to do this: 
1. WITHHOLDING: If you are an employee, your employer will withhold 
income tax from your pay. Tax is also withheld from other types of 
income -- including pensions, bonuses, commissions, and gambling 
winnings. In each case, the amount withheld is paid to the Internal 
Revenue Service in your name. 
a-4 
063888 
£ 
* * I F VoJ HAVE ANY QUESTIONS, 
Department of the Treasury * * REFER TO T H I S INFORMATION: 
Internal Revenue Service NUMBER OF T H I S N O T I C E : C P - 5 2 1 
OGDEN, UT 8 4 2 0 1 DATE OF T H I S N O T I C E : 0 3 - 1 5 - 9 5 
TAXPAYER IDENT. NUM: 528-44-9698 
TAX FORM: 1040 
TAX PERIOD: 12-31-90 
l.l!lll,IHIIIII..,Mt,!.li..l..,.l.l,.!l..l.l lllillilili 
DUANE G & V ARLENE WEIDEMAN 
1634 THORNHILL DRIVE APT 208 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84123-5936342 
FOR ASSISTANCE CALL: 1-800-829-1040 
YOUR NEXT PAYMENT IS DUE SOON 
Your next payment of $100.00 is due on 03-28-95. 
The current status of your account is shown below. We apply 
installment payments to tax periods in the order we assessed the 
periods. 
FORM NUMBER CAF TAX PERIOD ENDED AMOUNT 
1040 0 12-31-90 $71.64 
1040 0 12-31-92 $439.74 
Payment due $100.00 
Total balance owed including penalties and interest: 
<?& $511.38 
& W W Z ^ fit/ Hi>¥ 
The federal income tax is a "pay-as-you-go1* tax. You must pay the 
tax as you earn or receive income during the year. There are two 
easy ways to do this: 
1. WITHHOLDING: If you are an employee, your employer will withhold 
income tax from your pay. Tax is also withheld from other types of 
income -- including pensions, bonuses, commissions, and gambling 
winnings. In each case, the amount withheld is paid to the Internal 
Revenue Service in your name. 
If too little tax is being withheld from your wages to pay the 
taxes you will owe at the end of the year, you should file a new Form 
W-4, Employee's Withholding Allowance Certificate, with your employer 
to change the amount of withholding. 
a-5 V~~ (E> 
020? ~ 
Department of the Treasury 
internal Revenue Service 
OGDEN UT 84201 
DUANE G * V ARLENE WEIDEMAN 
P0 BOX 701766 
WEST VALLEY UT 84170-1766668 
m ypWjW 
^7010000 929 01 
IF YOU HAVE.ANY QUESTIONS, REFER TO THIS INFORMATION: 
LV DATE OF NOTICE: 06-15-94 521 • 
TAXPAYER IDENTIFYING NUMBER: 528-44-96 98 
FORM TAX YEAR DOCUMENT LOCATOR 
ENDED NUMBER 
1040 
1040 
CALL*- 1« 
OR 
12-31-90 
12-31-92 
•800-829-1040 J 
-
94139009 
, 94139009 
WRITE* CHIEF, TAXPAYER ASSISTANCE SECTION 
INTERNAL. REVENUE SERVICE CENTER 
OGDEN UT 84201 
IF YOU1 WRITE,, BE SURE TD ATTACH-THE BOTTOM PART OF THIS 
THIS IS TO REMIND YOU THAT YOUR MONTHLY PAYMENT REQUIRED BY YOUR INSTALLMENT 
AGREEMENT IS DUE ON 06-28-94, TO BE APPLIED AS FOLLOWS* 
FORM NUMBER 
1040 
1040 
CAF 
0 
0. 
TAX PERIOD ENDED 
12-31-90 
12-31-92 
AMOUNr 
$358.09 $399.13 
\r . .- PAYMENT-JUJE 
TOTAL BALANCE OWED INCLUDING PENALTIES AND INTEREST 
_-. _ $ioa.oo 
$757.22 
PLEASE RETURN THE BOTTOM PART OF THIS NOTICE WITH YOUR PAYMENT. AN ENVELOPE IS ENCLOSED 
FOR YOUR. CONVENIENCE. : THANJC YOU FOR YOUR COOPERATION. . . 
ENCLOSURES* J-"' > • . * '.— - ~ - * -. 
ENVELOPE; ' -:* /; v .^ ; '*....; , ~ -\ 
IF YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS, YOU MAY CALL OR> WRITE-5EE THE INFORMATION IN THE UPPER RIGHT CORNE 
OF THIS NOTICE. TQ'MAKE SURE THAT IRS EMPLOYEES*GIVE COURTEOUS RESPONSES 4ND CORRECT: 
INFORMATION TO.TAXPAYERS, A SECOND IRS EMPLOYEE 50METIME3 LISTENS IN ON TELEPHONE CALLS. 
KEEP THIS PART FOR YOUR RECORDS. „ V CUT HERE V 
10-532921754? 
; & ;4 :*?4 
^ 
UTAH f ~<VTE TAX COMMISSION 
Michael 0 . Leavitt 
Olene S. Walker 
LwuUMnt Governor 
W. Val Oveson, i 
Roger O. Tew, < 
Joe B. Pacheco, ( 
Alice Shearer, 
Rodney G. Marrelli, EMCUUV* Director 
August 5, 1994 
DUANE G WEIDEMAN 
P 0 BX 701766 
S L CITY UT 84170-1766 
RE: ACCOUNT NO. (S) 528-44-9698 
Dear Sir/Madam: 
This letter is to inform you that your Income tax liability 
for the period(s) 1990, 1991, 1992 has been placed in a hardship 
status with the Tax Commission. 
This means that we will not actively pursue collection of 
these delinquent taxes over the next twelve months, at which time 
we will reevaluate your ability to pay your tax liability. 
Although you will not be receiving regular notices of 
delinquency, interest will continue to accrue at the statutory rate 
on the unpaid balance. Any tax refunds you are entitled to will be 
credited to the delinquency and any tax liens that have been filed 
will remain in effect until the tax liability has been satisfied. 
Respectfully, 
t^jsm (JsCsiLSt&y) 
Kim Carlston 
Tax Compliance Agent 
Collection Division 
(801) 297-6210 
UN s s 
i 
lreffl DEFENDANT'S 
***** [EXHIBIT .
 T4 
Blaine W Smith, Director • Collections 
210 North 1950 West • Salt Lake Citv, Utah 54134 
Telephone (801) 297 6300 • Fax Number (801) 297 6358 
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